A Review of Corporate Governance Models

Abstract

Corporate governance has emerged as a central concern for organizations, regulators, investors, and society due to its significant influence on firm performance, accountability, transparency, and sustainability. Governance failures associated with corporate scandals and financial crises have intensified scholarly and policy interest in understanding how different corporate governance models operate across institutional and cultural contexts. This review paper critically examines major corporate governance models, including the shareholder, stakeholder, Anglo-American, Continental European, Japanese, and emerging market governance frameworks. Drawing on classical agency theory and contemporary perspectives such as stewardship, stakeholder, and resource dependence theories, the study synthesizes theoretical and empirical literature to evaluate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. A comparative analysis highlights structural differences, strengths, and limitations of governance models. The review concludes that no single governance model is universally optimal; rather, effective corporate governance depends on institutional environments, ownership structures, and strategic objectives. The paper contributes by offering an integrated understanding of corporate governance models and identifying future research directions.